Perhaps recognizing that reliance on Grutter cannot sustain their plans, both school districts assert additional interests, distinct from the interest upheld in Grutter, to justify their race-based assignments. Students may also apply to a magnet school or program, or, at the high school level, take advantage of an open enrollment plan that allows ninth-grade students to apply for admission to any nonmagnet high school. Second, broad-range limits on voluntary school choice plans are less burdensome, and hence more narrowly tailored, see Grutter, supra, at 341, than other race-conscious restrictions this Court has previously approved. One can attempt to identify a construction of Jefferson County’s student assignment plan that, at least as a logical matter, complies with these competing propositions; but this does not remedy the underlying problem. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents in No. Politics 987, 991 (1976) (similar in Georgia); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S. 39, 40, n. 1 (1971) (Clarke County, Georgia). 05–908, at 9–10, 47; App. His resides school was only a mile from his new home, but it had no available space—assignments had been made in May, and the class was full. What the government is not permitted to do, absent a showing of necessity not made here, is to classify every student on the basis of race and to assign each of them to schools based on that classification. See Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U. S. 267, 274 (1986); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 507 (1980). 28 U. S. C. §1257, see For the next decade, annual program transfers remained at approximately this level. No. As part of that burden it must establish, in detail, how decisions based on an individual student’s race are made in a challenged governmental program. of Boston in 1968. School districts can seek to reach Brown’s objective of equal educational opportunity. Here, in contrast, the schools worked backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance, rather than working forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the purported benefits. For several decades this Court has rested its public school decisions upon Swann’s basic view that the Constitution grants local school districts a significant degree of leeway where the inclusive use of race-conscious criteria is at issue. See 377 F. 3d 949, 1005–1006 (CA9 2004) (Parents Involved VI) (Graber, J., dissenting). The degree of heterogeneity within these districts is immediately apparent. Part I of this Article describes the Court’s decision in Parents Involved. Given the significant differences among these contexts, it would be surprising if the law required an identically strict legal test for evaluating the constitutionality of race-based criteria as to each of them. It is no answer to say that these cases can be distinguished from Brown because Brown involved invidious racial classifications whereas the racial classifications here are benign. First, there is a historical and remedial element: an interest in setting right the consequences of prior conditions of segregation. See, e.g., Part I–B, supra. In 1977, the NAACP filed another legal complaint, this time with the federal Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR). In light of the foregoing, Justice Breyer’s appeal to stare decisis rings particularly hollow. . This distinction is critically important in the context of education. The concerns of Parents Involved are illustrated by Jill Kurfirst, who sought to enroll her ninth-grade son, Andy Meeks, in Ballard High School’s special Biotechnology Career Academy. To hold to the contrary is to transform that test from “strict” to “fatal in fact”—the very opposite of what Grutter said. The plurality’s claim that Seattle was “never segregated by law” is simply not accurate. 19 Parents Involved in Cmty. in Briggs v. Elliott, O. T. 1953, No. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244, 301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peńa, 515 U. S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Learn. Indeed, in its brief Seattle simply assumes that the educational benefits track the racial breakdown of the district. The rights established are personal rights”). Public Schools, 330 F. Supp. In addition, Meredith sought damages in her complaint, which is sufficient to preserve our ability to consider the question. 51, p. 349 (J. Cooke ed. Other studies reach different conclusions. And I have explained how the plans before us are more narrowly tailored than those in Grutter. If this interest justifies race-conscious measures today, then logically it will justify race-conscious measures forever. Perhaps for this reason, the dissent conflates the concepts of segregation and racial imbalance: If racial imbalance equates to segregation, then it must also be constitutionally acceptable to use racial balancing to remedy racial imbalance. Indeed, in McDaniel, a case decided the same day as Swann, a group of parents challenged a race-conscious student assignment plan that the Clarke County School Board had voluntarily adopted as a remedy without a court order (though under federal agency pressure—pressure Seattle also encountered). Indeed, the very school districts that once spurned integration now strive for it. But what was constitutionally required of the district prior to 2000 was the elimination of the vestiges of prior segregation—not racial proportionality in its own right. 4–5 (Dec. 19, 1991) (1991 Memorandum). Race may be one component of that diversity, but other demographic factors, plus special talents and needs, should also be considered. , and by the host of state court decisions cited by Justice Breyer, see post, 25–27,8 were fully consistent with that disposition. Compare ante, at 39 (“history will be heard”), with Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U. S. ___, ___ (2007) (slip op., at 11) (Roberts, C. J., dissenting) (“It is a familiar adage that history is written by the victors”). 733 (1998). Resort to the record, including the parties’ Stipulation of Facts, further confuses the matter. It again redrew school assignment boundaries. in No. It was not the inequality of the facilities but the fact of legally separating children on the basis of race on which the Court relied to find a constitutional violation in 1954. See, e.g., North Carolina Bd. 84–1340, pp. Accepting racial balancing as a compelling state interest would justify the imposition of racial proportionality throughout American society, contrary to our repeated recognition that “[a]t the heart of the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class.” Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 911 (1995) (quoting Metro Broadcasting, 497 U. S., at 602 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); internal quotation marks omitted). See, e.g., n. 1, supra. Attorney General, to John F. Kennedy, President (Jan. 24, 1963) (hereinafter Kennedy Report), available at http://www.gilderlehrman.org/search/collection_pdfs/05/63/0/05630.pdf (all Internet materials as visited June 26, 2007, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file) (reporting successful efforts by the Government to induce voluntary desegregation). 662. In that case, I stressed the importance of confining a remedy for past wrongdoing to the members of the injured class. 163 U. S. 537 The districts have also failed to show they considered methods other than explicit racial classifications to achieve their stated goals. Level = School & orgLinkId = 1061 & yrs = ; http: // reportcard . For instance, a Texas appeals court in 1986 rejected a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a voluntary integration plan by explaining: “[T]he absence of a court order to desegregate does not mean that a school board cannot exceed minimum requirements in order to promote school integration. Post, at 22. 1986). 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007), also known as the PICS case, is a United States Supreme Court case. 3, p. 82–83 (“Our many hours of research and investigation have led only to confirmation of our view that segregation by race in Virginia’s public schools at this time not only does not offend the Constitution of the United States but serves to provide a better education for living for the children of both races”); Tr. Rather, the Court has insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination.” The Court’s decision in Croson, supra, reinforced the difference between the remedies available to redress de facto and de jure discrimination: “To accept [a] claim that past societal discrimination alone can serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open the door to competing claims for ‘remedial relief’ for every disadvantaged group. It predicts that today’s decision “threaten[s]” the validity of “[h]undreds of state and federal statutes and regulations.” Post, at 61; see also post, at 27–28. Accordingly, the school boards cannot satisfy strict scrutiny. No. Employees forced to return to the office could sue their bosses if they contract Covid-19 while at work or during their commute putting companies at legal risk if they breach a duty of care. According to the school’s most recent annual report, “[a]cademic excellence” is its “primary goal.” See African American Academy 2006 Annual Report, p. 2, online at http://www.seattleschools.org/area/ “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race … be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 78 Stat. 05–915, at 7 (quoting McFarland I, supra, at 842). See Brief for Respondents in No. Of course, if the Seattle school board were truly committed to the notion that diversity leads directly to educational benefits, operating a school with such a high “nonwhite” enrollment would be a shocking dereliction of its duty to educate the students enrolled in that school. of Ed et al., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In many such instances, the contentious force of legal challenges to these classifications, meritorious or not, would displace earlier calm”); post, at 65 (“Indeed, the consequences of the approach the Court takes today are serious. The Court has jurisdiction in these cases. In 1956, two years after Brown made clear that Kentucky could no longer require racial segregation by law, the Louisville Board of Education created a geography-based student assignment plan designed to help achieve school integration. The first tiebreaker selects for admission students who have a sibling currently enrolled in the chosen school. See Education Commission of the States, Open Enrollment: 50-State Report (2007), online at http://mb2.ecs.org/reports/Report.aspx?id=268. . But I can find no case in which this Court has followed Justice Thomas’ “colorblind” approach. At the same time it relies on inapplicable desegregation cases, misstatements of admitted dicta, and other noncontrolling pronouncements, Justice Breyer’s dissent candidly dismisses the significance of this Court’s repeated holdings that all racial classifications must be reviewed under strict scrutiny, see post, at 31–33, 35–36, arguing that a different standard of review should be applied because the districts use race for beneficent rather than malicious purposes, see post, at 31–36. See supra, at 37–45. The Constitution generally prohibits government race-based decisionmaking, but this Court has authorized the use of race-based measures for remedial purposes in two narrowly defined circumstances. [Footnote 22] The dissent argues that today’s decision “threatens to substitute for present calm a disruptive round of race-related litigation,” post, at 2, and claims that today’s decision “risks serious harm to the law and for the Nation,” post, at 65. More recently, the school district sent a delegation of high school students to a “White Privilege Conference.” See Equity and Race Relations White Privilege Conference, https://www.seattleschools. The dissent has no principled limit and would result in broad acceptance of gov't racial classifications in areas far afield from schooling. As to “drawing” neighborhood “attendance zones” on a racial basis, Louisville tried it, and it worked only when forced busing was also part of the plan. No. are abandoning the policy of segregation whenever local conditions and local attitudes make it feasible”), Brief for Appellees on Reargument in Davis v. County School Board, O. T. 1953, No. 1. In the present cases, by contrast, race is not considered as part of a broader effort to achieve “exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints,” ibid. That initial 1956 plan proved ineffective. The panel determined that while achieving racial diversity and avoiding racial isolation are compelling government interests, id., at 964, Seattle’s use of the racial tiebreaker was not narrowly tailored to achieve these interests, id., at 980. 1, pp. The plan paired (or “triaded”) “imbalanced” black schools with “imbalanced” white schools. Louisville began its integration efforts in earnest when a federal court in 1975 entered a school desegregation order. While the Court does not suggest that greater use of race would be preferable, the minimal impact of the districts’ racial classifications on school enrollment casts doubt on the necessity of using such classifications. We take the Grutter Court at its word. [Footnote 3] The only justification for refusing to acknowledge the obvious importance of that difference is the citation of a few recent opinions—none of which even approached unanimity—grandly proclaiming that all racial classifications must be analyzed under “strict scrutiny.” See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peńa, 515 U. S. 200, 227 (1995). 3, p. 71 (“[T]o make such a transition, would undo what we have been doing, and which we propose to continue to do for the uplift and advancement of the education of both races. in No. Id., at 162a–163a. Yesterday, the plans under review were lawful. But that is also true of the Clarke County schools in McDaniel. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986); Richmond v. J. See post, at 35 (citing 426 F. 3d 1162, 1193–1196 (CA9 2005) (concurring opinion) (citing Comfort v. Lynn School Comm., 418 F. 3d 1, 27–29 (CA1 2005) (Boudin, C. J., concurring))). ¶4 Memorandum Opinion and Order in Haycraft v. Board of Ed. 44, p. 6 (2003–04 Jefferson County Public Schools Elementary Student Assignment Application, Section B) (“Assignment is made to a school for Primary 1 (Kindergarten) through Grade Five as long as racial guidelines are maintained. The dissent overreads Grutter, however, in suggesting that it renders pure racial balancing a constitutionally compelling interest; Grutter itself recognized that using race simply to achieve racial balance would be “patently unconstitutional,” 539 U. S., at 330. ject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Racial_Transformation.pdf. And in each city, the school boards’ plans have evolved over time in ways that progressively diminish the plans’ use of explicit race-conscious criteria. 1 Le Lys Rouge (The Red Lily) 95 (W. Stephens transl. 2–6. To uphold these programs the Court is asked to brush aside two concepts of central importance for determining the validity of laws and decrees designed to alleviate the hurt and adverse consequences resulting from race discrimination. No. The plurality could validly claim that no court ever found that Seattle schools were segregated in law. 05–908, pp. Parents Involved in Cmty. 05–915, 416 F. 3d 513, reversed and remanded. . The argument ignores the dangers presented by individual classifications, dangers that are not as pressing when the same ends are achieved by more indirect means. 2d 834 (WD Ky. 2004); McFarland v. Jefferson Cty. 05–908, p. 7. Third, a more important response is the plurality’s claim that later cases—in particular Johnson, Adarand, and Grutter—supplanted Swann. Hence, their lawfulness follows a fortiori from this Court’s prior decisions. McFarland I, supra, at 837. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 920 (1995), and I shall subject the “tailoring” of their plans to “rigorous judicial review.” Grutter, 539 U. S., at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). of Cal. 2d, at 842, based on the objective of achieving at “all schools … an African-American enrollment equivalent to the average district-wide African-American enrollment” of 34 percent. See Grutter, 539 U. S., at 342 (stating the “requirement that all governmental use of race must have a logical end point”). . See supra, at 22–24. Test. Before Brown, the most prominent example of an exemplary black school was Dunbar High School. The Court has changed significantly since it decided School Comm. Third, the plans before us, subjected to rigorous judicial review, are supported by compelling state interests and are narrowly tailored to accomplish those goals. 62 Stat. This sentence reminds me of Anatole France’s observation: “[T]he majestic equality of the la[w], forbid[s] rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread.”[Footnote 1] The Chief Justice fails to note that it was only black schoolchildren who were so ordered; indeed, the history books do not tell stories of white children struggling to attend black schools. However, the actual hard-won gain in these cases is the elimination of the vestiges of the system of state-enforced racial separation that once existed in Louisville. Id., at 328 (“Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions”). According to the Supreme Court's precedents, rigid racial quotas are never narrowly tailored. The District has not met its burden of proving these marginal changes … outweigh the cost of subjecting hundreds of students to disparate treatment based solely upon the color of their skin.” 377 F. 3d, at 984–985 (footnote omitted). Bustop, addressing in the context of an emergency injunction application a busing plan imposed by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, is similarly unavailing. McFarland v. Jefferson Cty. After decades of vibrant life, they would all, under the plurality’s logic, be written out of the law. of Education and National Center for Education Statistics Common Core data). While the government is not required to take race into account to address problems arising from racial discrimination, it is constitutionally permitted to do so. Reduction of an individual to an assigned racial identity for differential treatment is among the most pernicious actions our government can undertake. No. Thus, only by ignoring Grutter’s reasoning can the dissent claim that recognizing a compelling interest in these cases is an a fortiori application of Grutter. . There, too, the distinction serves as a limit on the exercise of a power that reaches to the very verge of constitutional authority. In other words, it is not desegregation per se that improves achievement, but rather the learning advantages some desegregated schools provide.” Id., at 744. The idea that if race is the problem, race is the instrument with which to solve it cannot be accepted as an analytical leap forward. Similarly, the Federal courts which have considered the issue . of Oral Arg. Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499, 505–506 (2005); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 326 (2003); Adarand, supra, at 224. Few black residents lived outside the central section of the city. in No. And it expanded the transfer opportunities available to elementary and middle school pupils. Invoking our mandatory appellate jurisdiction,7 the Boston plaintiffs prosecuted an appeal in this Court. One commentator, reviewing dozens of studies of the educational benefits of desegregated schooling, found that the studies have provided “remarkably consistent” results, showing that: (1) black students’ educational achievement is improved in integrated schools as compared to racially isolated schools, (2) black students’ educational achievement is improved in integrated classes, and (3) the earlier that black students are removed from racial isolation, the better their educational outcomes. (b) The plurality opinion is too dismissive of government’s legitimate interest in ensuring that all people have equal opportunity regardless of their race. See supra, at 12. 2. Even in the context of mandatory desegregation, we have stressed that racial proportionality is not required, see Milliken, 433 U. S., at 280, n. 14 (“[A desegregation] order contemplating the substantive constitutional right [to a] particular degree of racial balance or mixing is … infirm as a matter of law” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. Racial imbalance is not segregation. of Oral Arg. 67–759, at 9 (“Unlike the Massachusetts Court, the Illinois Supreme Court has recently held its law to eliminate racial imbalance unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the [Footnote 13]. The present cases, unlike Fullilove but like our decision in Wygant, By 1988, many white families had left the school district, and many Asian families had moved in. The reasons for rejecting a motives test for racial classifications are clear enough. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Brief for Respondents in No. 1 of King Cty., Washington, and the OCR (June 9, 1978) (filed with the Court as Exh. [Footnote 3]. 2002); Brief for Armor et al. Seattle case: The Seattle public school system uses an integration “tiebreaker” in an open choice, noncompetitive high school assignment plan. School authorities are traditionally given broad discretionary powers to formulate and implement educational policy and may properly decide to ensure to their students the value of an integrated school experience.” Citizens for Better Ed. are subject to strict scrutiny, not all are invalidated No. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. The plan required that each elementary school in the district maintain 20% to 40% enrollment of African-American students, corresponding to the racial composition of the district. 05-908 AND 05-915 05–908, at 7. Yet, I have found no example or model that would permit this Court to say to Seattle and to Louisville: “Here is an instance of a desegregation plan that is likely to achieve your objectives and also makes less use of race-conscious criteria than your plans.” And, if the plurality cannot suggest such a model—and it cannot—then it seeks to impose a “narrow tailoring” requirement that in practice would never be met. . See Tr. of Oral Arg. This Court then held that the initiative—which would have prevented the Seattle Plan from taking effect—violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 1, supra. But the examples the dissent mentions—for example, a provision of the No Child Left Behind Act that requires States to set measurable objectives to track the achievement of students from major racial and ethnic groups, 20 U. S. C. §6311(b)(2)(C)(v)—have nothing to do with the pertinent issues in these cases. We simply do not understand how Justice Breyer can maintain that classifying every schoolchild as black or white, and using that classification as a determinative factor in assigning children to achieve pure racial balance, can be regarded as “less burdensome, and hence more narrowly tailored” than the consideration of race in Grutter, post, at 47, when the Court in Grutter stated that “[t]he importance of … individualized consideration” in the program was “paramount,” and consideration of race was one factor in a “highly individualized, holistic review.” 539 U. S., at 337. We are not social engineers. 1806, 20 U. S. C. §7231 et seq. In 2000–2001, when the racial tiebreaker was last used, Ballard’s total enrollment was 17.5 percent Asian-American, 10.8 percent African-American, 10.7 percent Latino, 56.4 percent Caucasian, and 4.6 percent Native-American. 102 Stat. Code §49.60.400(1) (2006). Justice Breyer’s dissent also asserts that these cases are controlled by Grutter, claiming that the existence of a compelling interest in these cases “follows a fortiori” from Grutter, post, at 41, 64–66, and accusing us of tacitly overruling that case, see post, at 64–66. In the real world, it is regrettable to say, it cannot be a universal constitutional principle. In Seattle, the parties settled after the school district pledged to undertake a desegregation plan. 3, p. 76 (“As time passes, it may well be that segregation will end”), with post, at 19 (“[T]hey use race-conscious criteria in limited and gradually diminishing ways”); post, at 48 (“[E]ach plan’s use of race-conscious elements is diminished compared to the use of race in preceding integration plans”); post, at 55 (describing the “historically-diminishing use of race” in the school districts). Swann, supra, at 6; see also Green v. School Bd. In 1963, at the insistence of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and other community groups, the school board adopted a new race-based transfer policy. Petitioner Parents Involved in Community Schools objected to Seattle’s most recent plan under the State and Federal Constitutions. Other problems are evident in Seattle’s system, but there is no need to address them now. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION et al. No. ¶1 See generally Seattle School Dist. [Footnote 10]. The transfer might have had an adverse effect on the effort to approach district-wide racial proportionality at Young, but it had nothing to do with preventing either the black or “other” group from becoming “small” or “isolated” at Young. of Boston v. Board of Education, 352 Mass. 1 (Nos. The Ninth Circuit initially reversed based on its interpretation of the Washington Civil Rights Act, 285 F. 3d 1236, 1253 (2002) (Parents Involved II), and enjoined the district’s use of the integration tiebreaker, id., at 1257. Id., at 335–336. Does the Constitution mandate this inefficient result? Due to a variety of factors—some influenced by government, some not—neighborhoods in our communities do not reflect the diversity of our Nation as a whole. We granted certiorari. See Washington State Report Even today, two of our wisest federal judges have rejected such a wooden reading of the Equal Protection Clause in the context of school integration. It contains 34 countywide districts with central cities (the 11 Florida districts fit this description, plus Clark County, Nevada and others) and a small number of consolidated districts (New Castle County, Delaware and Jefferson County, Kentucky). Swann, evaluating a school district engaged in court-ordered desegregation, had no occasion to consider whether a district’s voluntary adoption of race-based assignments in the absence of a finding of prior de jure segregation was constitutionally permissible, an issue that was again expressly reserved in Washington v. Seattle School Dist. The Court has changed significantly since it decided School Comm. . Syllabus; How to Read a Legal Opinion The plurality also points to the school districts’ use of numerical goals based upon the racial breakdown of the general school population, and it faults the districts for failing to prove that no other set of numbers will work. Parents Involved v. Seattle Schools (2007), the Supreme Court struck school assignment policies in Seattle and Louisville, leaving questions about what kinds of race conscious school assignment policies (RCSAPs) are constitutional. See ante, at 31-32, n. 16. 1, pp. We construe Brown as endorsing Mr. Justice Harlan’s classical statement in Plessy v. Ferguson, See Board of Ed. We have emphasized that the harm being remedied by mandatory desegregation plans is the harm that is traceable to segregation, and that “the Constitution is not violated by racial imbalance in the schools, without more.” Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 280, n. 14 (1977). Moreover, Parents Involved also asserted an interest in not being “forced to compete for seats at certain high schools in a system that uses race as a deciding factor in many of its admissions decisions.” Ibid. Tex. The minimal effect these classifications have on student assignments, however, suggests that other means would be effective. 05–908, at 38a–39a, 45a. id., at 390 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (expressing concern about “narrow fluctuation band[s]”). 05–915, P. 12, n. 13. To Harris? It added “magnet” programs at two high schools. This Court recognized as much in its opinion, which stated that the school board had an “affirmative duty to disestablish the dual school system.” McDaniel, supra, at 41. As I explained in Grutter, only “those measures the State must take to provide a bulwark against anarchy … or to prevent violence” and “a government’s effort to remedy past discrimination for which it is responsible” constitute compelling interests. Public Schools, 330 F. Supp. Similarly, in Zaslawsky v. Bd. The plan required redrawing school attendance zones, closing 12 schools, and busing groups of students, selected by race and the first letter of their last names, to schools outside their immediate neighborhoods. Indeed, the very school districts that once spurned integration now strive for it. How could such a plan be lawful the day before dissolution but then become unlawful the very next day? http: //www.seattleschools.org /area /siso /disprof /2005 /DP05 all.pdf. No. Establishing a “strong basis in evidence” requires proper findings regarding the extent of the government unit’s past racial discrimination. Gravity. Grutter, 539 U. S., at 345 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). The dissent does not and cannot answer these questions because the contours of the distinction it propounds rest entirely in the eye of the beholder. After all, a number of school districts in the South that the Government or private plaintiffs challenged as segregated by law voluntarily desegregated their schools without a court order—just as Seattle did. D (collecting citations of state and federal cases “[w]hich [e]nunciate the [p]rinciple that [s]tate [l]aws [p]roviding for [r]acial [s]egregation in the [p]ublic [s]chools do not [c]onflict with the Fourteenth Amendment”).
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